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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
I'

Case
No. 8537

-J

-vs..JOHN F. LEDKINS,
Defendant and Appellant.

Brief of Respondent

STATEMENT OF FACTS
The Statement of Facts presented in appellant's
brief is substantially true and respondent adopts it for
purposes of its argument herein.
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''

STATE1fENT OF POINTS
POINT I
THEAPPELLANTISPROPERLYCHARGED
WITH A STATUTORY OFFENSE.
POINT II
THE APPLICATION OF SECTIONS 64-9-38
A~D 64-9-41, UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 1953,
TO THE APPELLANT IS CONSTITUTIONAL
.:\XD HE H~\S XO STAXDIXG TO COMPLAIN
OF POSSIBLE UNCONSTITUTIONAL APPLICATIONS OF OTHER PARTS OF THOSE
STATUTES.
POINT III
THE LEGISLATURE H ...>\.S :.\IADE THE OFFE~SE CHARGED_.:\. FELONY.

~·\RGU::\IENT

POINT I
Tli~~ ~\ PPI·:LL~\XT I~

\VITH .\

PROPERLY CHARGED
OFFEXSE.

f'rr~\TPrrOR.Y

Onr code of rriminal procedure contains a provision
to the dfPd that an accused may be bound over on an
offense different from that originally set forth in the
complaint. ~edim1 77-15-19, Utah Code Annotated 1953,
reads:
2
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"If it appears from the examination that a
public offense has been committed and that there
is sufficient cause to believe the defendant guilty
thereof, the magistrate must indorse on the complaint an order, signed by him, to the following
effect: 'It appearing to me that the offense in the
within complaint mentioned (or any offense, aecording to the fact, stating generally the nature
thereof) has been committed, and that there is sufficient cause to believe the within named A B
guilty thereof, I order that he be held to ans·wer
til the same.' ''
In this case the appellant was charged originally
with wilfully and knowingly violating the rules and
regulations of the Utah State Prison while employed
there as a guard. At the preliminary hearing, prior to
the taking of any testimony, the complaint was amended
by the addition of a count charging him with attempting
to wilfully and knowingly supply drugs to an inmate
while employed as a guard at the prison. On the reverse side of the complaint, the committing magistrde
indorsed that the appellant was held to ans\ver to ''the
offense in the within complaint.'' The court's entry on
"\Iareh 15, 1956, shows that the first count was dismissed
and that it was necessarily the second count which
charged the offense on which the appellant was bound
over. The evidence in the preliminary hearing, then,
sho\vs ''sufficient cause'' to believe that an offense the attempt to wilfully and knowingly supply drng~
to an inmate while employed as a guard at the lTtah
State Prison- had been committed and that the appellant was the person who committed it.
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An information was then filed erroneously charging
the appellant in the language of the dismissed count. At
the hearing on appellant's Motions to Quash and to Dismiss, it was agreed that an amended information would
be filed correcting the error, and the motion was argued
as if that had previously been done (R. 26-27). Section
77-17-3, Utah Code Annotated 1953, permits amendment
of an information at any time before the plea is entered,
and the appellant has no basis for objection herein on
that point.
He does object, however, to the language of the
amended information. vVhere the count on which he
was bound over says, '' * * * did wilfully and knowingly
attempt to supply drugs * * *" the amended inforInation says "* * * the crime of attempting to gh,·e or
sell drugs * * * ''. (Italics supplied) This court is asked to
hold that this is fatal to the prosecution herein.
While the cases hold that an information gen(•rally is sufficient if it charges an offense in the lan-

guage of the statute, e.g., State Y. Stull r, 96 P. 2d 479
(\Vasl1. 1939), they do not hold that the exact statutory
language is a necessity. On the contrary, language substantially similar to the wording is sufficient. Sparkman
, .. State 93 P. 2d 1095, (Okla. 1939): Prople Y. Jan·is,
'27 P. 2d 77 (Cal. App. 1933). In Jlidki.tf Y. State, 30 P.
2d 1057, at page 1058 the .:\rizona Supreme Court said:
'·A comparison of the language of the information
with the wording of the statute shows that they
nre substantially the same. This is all that is re(1uired, especially where the offense is statutory,
as here. (cases cited)"
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And the language of Cornmonwealth v. GrecnP, 98 ~A. 2d
202 (Pa. 1953) is appropriate to the facts of this case.
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court said:
"It is not essential that the information be
couched in the precise language of the statute, if
the words used have substantially the same mean~
ing. Commonwealth v. Friedla-nder, 53 Pa. Super.
221. Failure to properly support, as charged, is
the precise equivalent of neglecting to maintain
within the contemplation of § 733 of the Act. Gf.
Commonwealth , .. George, 358 Pa. 118, 123, 56 A.
2d 228, ·where similar terms are used interchangeably. Contrary to appellant's contention, no one
could have been misled to conclude that the information intended to charge the defendant with the
indictable misdemeanor defined in§ 731 of the Act,
18 P. S. § 4731."

Although in this case it is the statement of the offense
on which the appellant was bound over, rather than the
information, which does not follow the exact language
of the statute, the rationale of the above cited cases
would seem to apply by necessary implica t] on. \Vha t is
important is that the appellant not be misled as to the
charge he must defend against, and there can be no
question that the language of the second count in the
complaint apprised this appellant and his counsel, that
the offense he was bound over on is the same crime
charged in thP language of the amended information.
This conclusion is supported by the definitions of
gice and supply found in Webster's new International
Dictionary, second edition:
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''GrvE

* *3. rro deliver or transfer (to another something that is taken by him). * * * Syn.-Supply, * * *"
•X<

''SUPPLY

* * * 6. To furnish or provide. Specif.: (a) to give
(something desired ,needed, etc.) ; * * * ''

Com1nonwealth v. Davis, 75 Ky. 24, 241 (1876), held that
the word give should not be limited to a strict meaning
of transfer without consideration, where used in an
indictment for violation of the liquor laws of Kentucky.
The court said :
"In its strict and primary sense the word 'give~
signifies 'to confer or transfer without any price
or reward; to bestow.· In its more enlarged sense
it signifies 'to furnish, to supply' : and it was in
this latter sense the word was used in the statute."
rrhe foregoing authorities show clearly that there
1s no substance to the appellant's contention that he
received no preliminary hearing on the offense charged
in tht> information.

POINT II
rl'HE
~\~D

APPLICATIO~

OF SECTIOXS 64-9-38

64-9-41, UTAH CODE

.A~XOT.A.TED

1953,

rro THE APPELLANT IS CONSTITUTIONAL
.\:\D HE HAS NO ~T ..1~D1XG TO COMPLAIN
OF POSSIBLE UNCONSTITUTIONAL APPLH~~\rriONS OF OTHER PARTS OF THOSE
Sr:l'A rrUT ES.

rJ'his appeal is taken at a point in the proceedings
:tgaiust the appellant at whirh he stands charged by
6
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an amended information of the statutory offense of attempting, while employed as a guard at the Utah State
Prison, to wilfully and knowingly, give or sell drugs to
an inmate of the prison. The offense is made out by
reading together Sections 64-9-41 and 64-9-38, Utah
Code Annotated 1953, and applying our statute on attempts, Section 76-1-30.
Section 69-941 says, among other things, that no
drug shall be given to any convict in the prison except
by the prison physician and then only if the convict
is ill. Section 64-9-38, Utah Code Annotated 1953, so far
as pertinent, reads as follows :
'' * * * Any guard, keeper or other employee of the
state prison who knowingly violates any rule or
regulation adopted by the board, or who violates
any of the provisions of this chapter, or who neglects to perform the duties required of him by the
rules and regulations of the prison or by the provisions of this chapter, is guilty of a felony, and
may be punished by a fine not exceeding $1,000 or
by imprisonment in the state prison for a period
not exceeding three years, or by both such fine
and imprisonment.''
That the appellant was at first charged under
another part of Section 64-9-38 and that such other part
of the section is of doubtful constitutionality, even if
true, matters not at all at this point. The appellant has
no standing to challenge in this court possible unconstitutional applications of a statute resulting from an
active imagination and having no basis in fact with respect to him. It is a basic concept of constitutional law

7
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that a party cannot raise conjectural issues having no
relation to the facts in the matter at bar. 11 Am. Jur.
Constl. Law, Sec. 111, states in part:
"It has been said that courts cannot pass on
the question of the constitutionality of a statute
abstractly, but only as it applies and is sought to
be enforced in the determination of a particular
case before the court, for the power to revoke or
repeal a statute is not judicial in its character. "" "" ""
''One cannot invoke, in order to defeat a law,
an apprehension of what might be done under it
and which, if done, might not receive judicial approval ; to complain of a ruling one must be the
victim of it. * * *
''These principles apply fully to criminal
proceedings. * * • An accused cannot raise the
question of the constitutionality of a statute
which is not the basis of the prosecution against
him. Thus, a defendant charged with the violation of a statute, but not charged with any act
coming under a certain severable section of the
statute, is without the interest necessary to question the Yalidity of that section. • • •"
To the same effect are rnited Public Workers v.
il/it('hell, 330 F. S. /;) (1947); Kay Y. Fnited States, 303
U.S. 1 (1938); Coffman Y. Breeze C'orporations,323 U.S.
316 (1945) and Shinn Y. Oklahoma City, 87 P. 2d 136
(Okla. 1939).
Apellnut maintains that the statute in question is
not seYerahle and that this case therefore comes within
t ht' sometime-recognized exception to the above general rule that where an act is indivisible, a party may

8
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successfully attack its invalid portions even though they
do not affect his rights. Even if this exception were
held to be the law in Utah, we see no basis for its application in this case. The part of the section to which
appellant objects is that which makes a violation of the
prison rules and regulations a felony. But it is not shown
how this relates to the part making a violation of the
provisions of Chapter 9 a crime, and there apparently is
no relationship. The deletion of the alleged invalid provisions by no stretch of the imagination disembowels
this statute. Under the remaining language there are
left sixty-three separate sections of Chapter 9, Title 64
to be enforced, all of them definite, clear statements of
the legislative will.
The test, according to Sutherland Statutory Constitution, 3rd edition, Section 2404 '' * * * is whether
or not the legislature would have passed the statute had
it been presented with the invalid features removed."
Quoting further in the same section, "In statutes not
containing a separability clause, the independence of the
valid portion of a statute will be a principle indicia of
the legislative intent that a statute be separately enforced.'' It is true that in borderline cases, criminal
statutes are sometimes put to a more stringent severability test than are civil statutes, Sutherland, Section
2418, 11 Am. Jur, Constitutional Law, Section 166, but
this is not a borderline case. The wording of the section applicable to the appellant in this case leaves no
doubt that it stands independent of the alleged unconstitutional portions. Where that is so, the remaining
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provisions must be given effect. 11 Am. J ur. Constitutional Law 152. Smith v. Carbon County, 81 P. 2d 370
(Utah 1938).

POINT III
THE LEGISLATURE HAS l\'IADE THE OFFENSE CHARGED A FELONY.
Chapter 9 of Title 64, Utah Code Annotated 1953,
deals with the Government of the Utah State Prison
and Section 64 thereof makes a violation of any of its
provisions by any person, firm, or corporation a misdemeanor. Section 38 singles out guards or keepers, and
says that if any such shall violate any provision of the
chapter he is guilty of a felony. This arrangement of
penal provisions is in accordance with the recommendation of Sutherland, supra, at Section 4826, where he
states:
''The better practice is to place a general penalty
section at the end or near the end of the act and
provide that any violation of the provisions of the
act is punishable according to the terms of the
penalty section. If it is desirable to punish some
acts more severely than others, by the increased
penalties for the violation of particular provisions, the increased penalties should be added as
separate sections immediately following the general penalty section. In this way the legislative
intent is clearly expressed. Occasionally, it is justifiable to include particular penalty provisions
at the place in the statute where the prohibited
act is specified, but as a general rule the inclusion
of the penalties at the end of the statute permits
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a more orderly development of the legislative regulation and creates a clearer picture of the
liabilities which the act specifies."
No reason appears why effect may not be given to
both provisions of this statute. Western Beverage Co.
of Provo v. Hansen, 96 P. 2d 1105 (Utah 1939), State v.
Gates, 221 P. 2d 878 (Utah 1950). The two provisions
are in no way conflicting, and each can be given its
proper application by following the rule that where two
statutory provisions deal with the same subject matter,
one being specific and the other general in its treatment,
the specific provision controls the general. Salt Lake
City v. Salt Lake County, 209 P. 207 (Utah 1922) and
cases there cited; State ex rei Public Service Commisswn v. Southern Pacific Company, 79 P. 2d 25 (Utah
1938).
CONCLUSION
The appellant is properly charged with a statutory
offense which violates no provision of our Constitution
and on which he has been given a proper preliminary
hearing. This appeal should be dismissed and the matter returned to the District Court for trial on the merits.
Respectfully, submitted,
E. R. CALLISTER
Attorney General

K. ROGER BEAN
Assistant Attorney General
Attorneys for Respondent
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